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THE $1.75 TRILLION LIE 
Lisa Heinzerling* 
Frank Ackerman** 
A 2010 study commissioned by the Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small 
Business Administration claims that federal regulations impose annual economic 
costs of $1.75 trillion. This estimate has been widely circulated, in everything from 
op-ed pages to Congressional testimony. But the estimate is not credible. For costs 
of economic regulations, the estimate reflects a calculation that rests on a misun-
derstanding of the definition of the relevant data, flunks an elementary question 
on the normal distribution, pads the analysis with several years of near-identical 
data, and fails to recognize the difference between correlation and causation. For 
costs of environmental regulation, the bulk of the estimate relies on decades-old 
studies of decades-old rules, suggesting that voluntary unemployment is the real 
culprit in today’s regulatory environment. The remainder of it is filled with non-
existent rules and other phantoms—as is the flawed estimate of the costs of 
workplace safety and health rules. 
It would be bad enough if this were a private study, undertaken with pri-
vate funds. Even then, the viral spread of the utterly unfounded $1.75 trillion 
estimate would be worrying enough. But this is a study requested, funded, re-
viewed, and edited by a government agency, the Small Business Administration’s 
Office of Advocacy. The Office of Advocacy’s sponsorship and official embrace of 
the study—including defense of the study in testimony before Congress even after 
it had been severely criticized—embroils this public agency in an unwholesome 
blend of ineptitude and bias. The Office of Advocacy should acknowledge the 
study’s many failings and publicly disavow it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Keeping regulation at bay requires hard work. Disastrous failures of 
regulation lie just beneath such spectacularly bad problems as the financial 
breakdown,1 the oil spill in the Gulf,2 the nuclear meltdown in Japan,3 the 
climate crisis,4 and more.5 It takes constant vigilance to prevent a public 
outcry for more and better regulation. It also often takes phony numbers. 
The latest and biggest phony number being circulated by the anti-
regulatory crowd is the figure of $1.75 trillion—supposedly the amount we 
in the United States spend every year on federal regulations.6 This figure 
has been widely cited and credulously accepted. It has been wheeled out 
both to try to defeat new regulatory initiatives and to scale back existing 
ones.7 It has also been deployed in the service of a legislative agenda aimed 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See, e.g., Anthony Faiola et al., What Went Wrong, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008, at A1. 
 2. See, e.g., John Wyeth Griggs, BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, 32 ENERGY L.J. 57, 66, 79 
(2011). 
 3. See, e.g., James Glanz & Norimitsu Onishi, Japanese Rules for Nuclear Plants Relied 
on Old Science, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2011, at A1 (discussing underestimation of tsunami risk 
to nuclear reactors by Japanese regulators and industry); Daniel Kaufmann & Veronika 
Penciakova, Preventing Nuclear Meltdown: Assessing Regulatory Failure in Japan and the United 
States, BROOKINGS (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0401_nuclear_ 
meltdown_kaufmann.aspx. 
 4. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Health Regulation and Governance: Climate Change, 
Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary Principle, 96 GEO. L.J. 445, 455-58 (2008) (discussing 
years of missed opportunities to act on climate change). 
 5. SIDNEY SHAPIRO ET AL., SAVING LIVES, PRESERVING THE ENVIRONMENT, 
GROWING THE ECONOMY: THE TRUTH ABOUT REGULATION 7-9 (2011), available at 
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/RegBenefits_1109.pdf (discussing the cost of 
various failures to regulate). 
 6. NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON 
SMALL FIRMS, at iv (2010). The study was developed under contract number SBAHQ-08-
M-0466 for the Small Business Association’s (SBA) Office of Advocacy. 
 7. As the blog for the Center for Progressive Reform has observed, one recent 
congressional hearing prominently featured the $1.75 trillion figure. Ben Somberg, Debunked 
SBA Regulatory Costs Study Front and Center at House Energy & Commerce Committee  
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at hamstringing the regulatory agencies responsible for these purportedly 
massive costs.8 It has even become part of the rhetoric of the race for the 
presidency.9 
The number comes from a report commissioned, reviewed, edited, and, 
despite withering criticisms of it, defended by the Office of Advocacy of 
the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA). Authored by Lafayette 
College economists Nicole V. Crain and W. Mark Crain, the SBA-
sponsored report concludes that $1.75 trillion is the combined annual cost 
of complying with economic regulations, environmental regulations, the 
federal tax code, occupational safety and health regulations, and homeland 
security regulations.10 
The Crain and Crain report is, as Obama regulatory czar Cass Sunstein 
put it in recent congressional testimony, “deeply flawed.”11 Several previous 
                                                                                                                      
Hearing, CPRBLOG (July 15, 2011), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm? 
idBlog=2E0DC7E3-B914-9703-69CC0D539EF8EC34; see also The Views of the Administra-
tion on Regulatory Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On the Energy and Commerce, 
Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigation, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce by William L. Kovacs, Senior Vice President, Environment, Technology 
and Regulatory Affairs); Thomas M. Arnold & Jerry L. Stevens, Mixed Agendas and Gov-
ernment Regulation of Business: Can We Clean Up The Mess?, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1059, 1073 
(2011); James L. Gattuso et al., Red Tape Rising: Obama’s Torrent of New Regulation, 
HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 26, 2010, at 1, available at http://thf_media.s3. 
amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2482.pdf; Phil Kerpen, Op-Ed., Regulatory State Needs More 
Than a Trim, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at B3; Mark R. Warner, Op-Ed., Red-Tape Relief 
for a Sluggish Recovery, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2010, at A19; Glenn Kessler, Is Obama Bad for 
Business?, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fact-
checker/2011/01/is_obama_bad_for_business.html (quoting Thomas Donohue, President of 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.), Chairman of the House 
Oversight Committee, who both cite Crain and Crain’s study).  
 8. See, e.g., Wayne Crews & Ryan Young, Op-Ed., Regulation Without Representation, 
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Feb. 9, 2011, at A13; Thomas A. Hemphill, REINing in Regulation, 
AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.american.com/archive/2010/november/ 
reining-in-regulation.  
 9. See, e.g., Mitt Romney, Op-Ed., Romney: My Plan to Turn Around the U.S. Economy, 
USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 2011, at A11 (“With scant regard for the costs imposed on consumers 
and businesses, President Obama has vastly expanded the regulatory reach of government. 
The federal government has estimated the price tag for its regulations at $1.75 trillion.”); 
Tim Pawlenty, Former Governor of Minnesota and Former 2012 Presidential Candidate, 
Economic Policy Remarks at the University of Chicago: A Better Deal (June 7, 2011)  
(transcript available at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/06/07/text-of-pawlentys-speech-
on-his-economic-plan/) (“But the fact is—federal regulations will cost our economy 1.75 
trillion dollars this year alone. It’s a hidden tax on every American consumer. Built into the 
price of every good and service in the economy.”). 
 10. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at iv, 5. 
 11. See, e.g., Jessica Randall, OIRA Administrator Sunstein Calls Crain & Crain Report 
‘Deeply Flawed,’ OMB WATCH (June 23, 2011), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/11742 (dis-
cussing the oral testimony given by Sunstein on June 23, 2011 at the hearing before the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs). 
  
130 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 1:1 
 
critiques of the report have pointed out that not only does the report  
completely omit discussion of the benefits of regulation—thus providing an 
entirely one-sided picture of regulatory consequences—it also uses evidence 
not intended, nor suitable, for the purposes to which Crain and Crain put 
it.12 It also explains away its own potential cost overestimation by assert-
ing—contrary to existing evidence13—that regulatory agencies tend to 
underestimate regulatory costs.14 The nonpartisan Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) undertook its own regression analysis using almost the same 
data, but much sounder methods than those used by Crain and Crain, and 
found that, with those adjustments, a central component of Crain and 
Crain’s analysis (the “regulatory quality index” developed by the World 
Bank for a different purpose) ceased having the effect Crain and Crain 
claimed for it.15 
Our Article takes another, even deeper plunge into Crain and Crain’s  
estimates of costs, and finds even more troubling problems. We focus on 
Crain and Crain’s estimates of the costs of economic regulation, environ-
mental regulation, and workplace safety and health regulation. Together, 
these categories account for approximately $1.6 trillion of Crain and Crain’s 
$1.75 trillion estimate.16  
For economic regulation, we find that Crain and Crain come up with a 
breathtaking $1.24 trillion in estimated aggregate costs—seventy percent of 
their entire numerical picture of regulatory burden—from a single, poorly 
designed equation which they built on a misinterpretation of a World Bank 
database. They take this equation as proof that better “regulatory quality” 
causes higher incomes; and they read the World Bank data quite incorrectly 
to say that there is a well-defined maximum for regulatory quality which 
the United States falls far below. We will identify four serious errors in the 
Crain and Crain treatment of economic costs; each of these errors alone is 
sufficient to invalidate their analysis. 
Crain and Crain’s estimates of the costs of environmental regulation are 
also deeply troubled. For environmental rules issued before 1988, they rely 
                                                                                                                      
 12. See, e.g., Austin Goolsbee, A 21st Century Regulatory System, WHITE HOUSE BLOG 
(June 23, 2011, 3:08 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/06/23/21st-century-
regulatory-system. For a detailed critique making these and other points, see SIDNEY A. 
SHAPIRO ET AL., SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE CRAIN AND CRAIN REPORT ON 
REGULATORY COSTS (2011), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/SBA_ 
Regulatory_Costs_Analysis_1103.pdf. 
 13. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 12, at 7–9; ISAAC SHAPIRO & JOHN IRONS, 
REGULATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE ECONOMY: FEARS OF JOB LOSSES ARE OVERBLOWN 
21-23 (2011), available at http://www.epi.org/files/2011/BriefingPaper305.pdf. 
 14. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 27, 28 n.27. 
 15. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41763, ANALYSIS OF AN 
ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 27–28 (2011).  
 16. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 31 tbl.6. 
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on a single study published in 199117 that uses a general equilibrium model 
to spin out a tortuous conjecture about a possible impact of early 1980s 
regulations as a whole: if regulatory costs raise prices in general, then real 
wages will drop; at lower real wages, textbook economics implies  
that workers will choose to work less, reducing output and incomes. For 
regulatory costs of environmental rules issued after 1988, Crain and 
Crain—among other mistakes—claim costs for regulations that no longer 
exist because the agency itself pulled them back; they include costs of rules 
that no longer exist because the courts overturned them; they double count 
by including sets of rules that all have the same regulatory end; and they 
include the costs of regulations issued many years, sometimes decades, ago, 
the current costs of which (if they still even exist) cannot be fairly attributed 
to regulatory programs. 
In estimating the cost of workplace rules, Crain and Crain rely—
indirectly, after laundering it through several more recent studies from 
marginally less partisan sources—on a study done in 1974 by the National 
Association of Manufacturers.18 Beyond reliance on an outdated and highly 
partisan source, Crain and Crain’s estimates of the costs of workplace rules 
also suffer from the same flaws embodied in their estimates of the costs of 
environmental rules. 
Added to the numerous flaws already revealed by other commentators, 
the problems we have found with Crain and Crain’s estimate of regulatory 
costs raise a disturbing possibility: the mistakes are so many, cut in only 
one direction so thoroughly, and could have been discovered by the authors 
so easily, that one is pressed to conclude that the study was designed to 
produce a really big number. The number is a rhetorical device, a talking 
point, a trope; it is not the product of sound analysis. 
We have been here before. Previous periods of discontent with the scope 
and content of regulatory activity have also featured arresting statistics that, 
all by themselves, appear to make the case for regulatory reform: federal 
regulations spend hundreds of millions, even billions, of dollars to save a 
single human life;19 regulation “statistically murders” 60,000 people a year 
by directing limited resources to very expensive life-saving measures rather 
                                                                                                                      
 17. Id. at 25 (noting their reliance on Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and 
Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233 (1991) for cost estimates 
on environmental regulations). 
 18. Id. at 30 n.29 (noting that they rely on Joseph M. Johnson, A Review and Synthesis 
of the Cost of Workplace Regulations, in CROSS-BORDER HUMAN RESOURCES, LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT ISSUES 433 (Andrew P. Morriss & Samuel Estreicher eds., 2005)). Johnson’s 
study relies on HARVEY S. JAMES, JR., ESTIMATING OSHA COMPLIANCE COSTS (1996), a 
policy study conducted for the Center for the Study of American Business, which, finally, 
directly relies on the 1974 study by the National Association of Manufacturers.  
 19. John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REG., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 25, 30-31. 
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than to cheaper ones;20 once a regulation costs more than a certain amount 
(estimates ranged from $3 to $50 million) to save a life, people are killed 
through this cost alone because it prevents spending money on other life-
saving measures like health care.21 Just as the $1.75 trillion figure is being 
served up now as Exhibit 1 in the case for regulatory reform,22 so these 
previous statistics were offered to prove that the regulatory system had 
gone badly awry. 
We have challenged the empirical basis for these previous numbers at 
length elsewhere,23 and we will not repeat our criticisms here. It is worth 
noting, though, that in our long experience with fantastical numbers offered 
in the service of an anti-regulatory agenda, we have not seen anything quite 
like Crain and Crain’s number. The new high figure for regulatory costs 
marks a new low in anti-regulatory analysis. 
I. GETTING TO NO:  
HOW CRAIN AND CRAIN REACH $1.75 TRILLION 
Before turning to our critique, we need to explain how Crain and Crain 
reached their estimates of regulatory costs.  
Crain and Crain divide regulatory costs into several different categories 
(economic regulations, environmental regulations, the federal tax code, 
occupational safety and health regulations, and homeland security regula-
tions), and use several different methodologies, depending on the category, 
for estimating these costs.24 We assess the estimates pertaining to economic 
regulations, environmental regulations, and occupational safety and health 
regulations. Together, these categories make up over ninety percent of 
Crain and Crain’s overall estimate of annual United States regulatory 
costs.25 
                                                                                                                      
 20. Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social 
Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS 
FROM REGULATION 167, 172 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996). 
 21. E.g., Randall Lutter et al., The Cost-Per-Life-Saved Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing 
Regulations, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 599 (1999); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY (SPECIAL ISSUE) 5 (1994). 
 22. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 23. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE 
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); Lisa Heinzerling, Five Hundred 
Life-Saving Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate Over Regulatory Reform, 13 RISK, 
SAFETY & ENV’T 151 (2002) [hereinafter Five Hundred Life-Saving Interventions]; Lisa 
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998); Lisa Hein-
zerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory Movement, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 648 (2002). 
 24. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 31 tbl.6. 
 25. See id.  
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A. Economic Regulations 
The $1.24 trillion supposedly lost to economic regulations is described 
as an estimate of the costs of compliance, but no specific regulations are 
described in any detail, and no costs are presented for any actual compli-
ance activities. Rather, the entire $1.24 trillion comes from a single equation 
formulated by Crain and Crain, using comparative international data on per 
capita incomes and a World Bank “regulatory quality index” (RQI), among 
other variables.26 The equation finds a positive relationship between income 
per capita and the RQI. The United States received a very good, but not 
perfect, score on the RQI; if it had received a perfect score, the equation 
seems to imply that GDP would have been $1.24 trillion higher. 
The RQI is one of six “governance indicators” calculated by World 
Bank researchers Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi.27 
They define “regulatory quality” as “capturing perceptions of the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private sector development.”28 The other five 
indicators are voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption. 
Values of these six indicators are available for more than 200 countries, 
starting in 1996 and appearing annually since 2002.29  
As explained in their paper on methodology, Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi collect information from thirty-one different data sources, in-
cluding commercial business information providers, surveys, NGOs, and 
public sector sources.30 Each individual observation is converted into a 
numerical score, with higher values for better outcomes.31 The authors then 
make what they call the “innocuous” assumption that the true quality of 
governance in each area (the quality of regulation, for the RQI) is “a  
normally distributed random variable with mean zero and variance one. 
This means that the units of our aggregate governance indicators will also 
be those of a standard normal random variable, i.e. with zero mean, unit 
standard deviation, and ranging approximately from -2.5 to 2.5.”32 The final 
portion of this quotation simply reflects a well-known mathematical result: 
                                                                                                                      
 26. See id. at 21-22. 
 27. Worldwide Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK GRP., http://info.worldbank.org/ 
governance/wgi/pdf/wgidataset.xls (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).  
 28. Daniel Kaufmann et al., The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and 
Analytical Issues 4 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Policy Research Working Paper  
No. 5430, 2010), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMACRO/Resources/ 
WPS5430.pdf. 
 29. Worldwide Governance Indicators, supra note 27. 
 30. Kaufmann et al., supra note 28, at 2.  
 31. Id. at 8. 
 32. Id. at 9. 
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about ninety-nine percent of the time, a random variable with a normal 
distribution falls within 2.5 standard deviations of the mean. 
Crain and Crain evidently misread this statement; they reported that 
the RQI “is scaled to have values that range from -2.5 to 2.5.”33 Since they 
reported34 that the United States had a RQI of 1.579 in 2008, it appeared to 
them that it would have been possible to improve our regulations up to a 
level that received a 2.5. Therefore, they constructed a regression analysis to 
estimate the economic benefit that would result from improving the U.S. 
RQI from 1.579 to 2.5. 
The equation used in Crain and Crain’s regression analysis expresses 
GDP per capita as a function of the RQI and several other variables: for-
eign trade as a share of GDP, total population, primary school enrollment 
as a share of the eligible population, and broadband subscribers as a share of 
the population. This selection of variables is explained only by the state-
ment that they “are drawn from the empirical literature that examines 
differences in economic levels across countries and over time.”35 The equa-
tion is estimated using seven years of annual data, from 2002 through 2008, 
for twenty-five countries that belong to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)—an organization whose member-
ship is roughly, though no longer exactly, synonymous with high-income, 
developed countries. 
The regression results show that GDP per capita is positively related to 
the RQI, to the share of foreign trade in GDP, and to the proportion of 
broadband subscribers in the population. It also shows that GDP per capita, 
in this data set, is significantly negatively related to the fraction of the popu-
lation in primary education.36 Thus if this regression were accurate, and if 
correlation always implied causation, GDP per capita could be increased 
by raising the RQI, the dependence on foreign trade, or the number of 
broadband subscribers, or by decreasing enrollment in primary education. 
Judging by Crain and Crain’s regression results, the relationship between 
broadband connections and per capita income is by far the most reliable of 
these links.37 
                                                                                                                      
 33. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 21. 
 34. The World Bank Group updates RQI data from time to time; the United States’ 
RQI for 2008 is now 1.550 per the data we downloaded in November 2011. Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators, supra note 27. 
 35. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 21–22. 
 36. Id. at 23 tbl.2.  
 37. Table 2 in Crain and Crain’s report shows a t statistic of 8.89 for the relationship 
of broadband subscription rates to GDP per capita, far above any other t statistic in the 
table. Id. The t statistic is a measure of the statistical significance of a relationship: the larger 
the t statistic, the less likely it is that the observed relationship occurred by chance.  
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Using these regression results and holding all other data constant, 
Crain and Crain reported that an increase of 0.92 in the RQI (from 1.579 to 
2.5) would correspond to an 8.7% increase in GDP per capita, or a $1.236 
trillion increase in total U.S. GDP in 2008, measured in 2009  
dollars.38  
B. Environmental Regulations 
Crain and Crain estimate the current annual cost of United States  
environmental regulation to be $281 billion.39 To reach this number, Crain 
and Crain add up all of the costs presented in the Office of Management 
and Budget’s (OMB) 2001 to 2009 reports on the costs and benefits of 
federal regulations (and adjust them for inflation).40 OMB’s reports from 
2002 through 2009 estimate the total costs and benefits of the previous 
year’s regulations by compiling estimates—with some adjustments—from 
agencies’ Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIA) for rules costing $100 million 
or more per year.  
OMB’s 2001 report, relied upon by Crain and Crain for the vast bulk 
of the costs they attribute to environmental regulation,41 took a different 
tack. In this report, OMB estimated costs for rules issued from the begin-
ning of the modern environmental era all the way through the first quarter 
of the year 2000.42 For rules issued prior to 1989, OMB based its high-end 
estimate on a 1991 article by Robert Hahn and John Hird,43 which itself 
relied on a 1990 study by Michael Hazilla and Raymond Kopp.44 Almost 
half of Crain and Crain’s estimate of the current annual costs of environ-
mental regulation—$132 out of $281 billion—comes from Hahn and Hird’s 
estimate of the costs of rules issued over twenty-five years ago.45 
                                                                                                                      
 38. Id. at 24. The actual calculation of $1.236 trillion is not well explained. Our 
attempt to reproduce it, using their assumptions, yielded $1.30 trillion.  
 39. Id. at 31 tbl.6 (reporting costs in 2009 dollars). 
 40. Id. at 26 tbl.3. 
 41. Id. (reporting high-end cost estimates of almost $192 billion (in 2001 dollars) 
based on OMB’s 2001 report; this is approximately $230 billion in 2009 dollars). 
 42. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MAKING SENSE OF REGULATION: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED 
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 10 n.7, 11 tbl.2 (2001) [hereinafter 
OMB 2001 REPORT]. OMB’s 2001 report actually relies on OMB’s 2000 report for this 
estimate. Id. at 11 tbl.2 (referring, in the source note, to OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS tbls.1, 2 
& 3 (2000) [hereinafter OMB 2000 REPORT]). 
 43. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 25; Hahn & Hird, supra note 17, at 256 tbl.2. 
 44. Michael Hazilla & Raymond Kopp, The Social Cost of Environmental Quality 
Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. POL. ECON. 853, 865 tbl.2 (1990). 
 45. See CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 27 (utilizing the high end of the cost range 
provided in Hahn & Hird, supra note 17, at 256 tbl.2); OMB 2000 REPORT, supra note 42, at 
20 tbl.1 (reporting a high-end cost estimate of $99 billion (in 1996 dollars) for environmental 
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Hazilla and Kopp used general equilibrium analysis to estimate the 
costs of environmental regulation. They modeled the economy as it existed 
from 1958 to 1974 in order to establish a pre-regulation baseline. They then 
re-ran the model, this time incorporating the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) 1984 estimate of the costs of compliance with the Clean 
Air Act and the Clean Water Act, based on the regulations in place as of 
December 1982. In their analysis, the direct costs of regulation raise prices 
throughout the economy. Higher prices cause lower real wages, inducing 
workers to work less (in the language of economics, households choose to 
substitute leisure for labor). The reduction in labor decreases income, con-
sumption, and savings, relative to the pre-regulation baseline. Lower 
savings means less investment, slowing the economy’s rate of growth and 
causing decreases in production that are compounded over time. Simulating 
outcomes from 1981 through 1990, Hazilla and Kopp estimated that house-
hold labor supply would decrease by about 1%, and real (inflation-adjusted) 
gross national product would decrease by 2.4% in 1981, and 5.8% in 1990.46  
For the environmental rules issued between 1989 and 2000, OMB’s 
2001 report (and, by extension, Crain and Crain) relied on OMB’s 2000 
report, which itself relied on a report OMB issued in 1996 (estimating costs 
for rules issued from 1987 to 1994), along with estimates of the costs of 
rules from 1995 to 1999.47 
C. Workplace Regulations 
Crain and Crain estimate costs of $64.313 billion for occupational  
safety and health regulations issued prior to 2001, and $471 million for such 
regulations issued between 2001 and 2008.48 For the costs of rules issued 
before 2001, Crain and Crain rely on an analysis published in 2005 by 
Joseph M. Johnson.49 Johnson estimated the costs of workplace safety and 
health rules by multiplying earlier estimates of these costs by 5.55, based 
upon findings in a 1974 study conducted by the National Association of 
Manufacturers.50 For the costs of rules issued between 2001 and 2008, 
Crain and Crain use an aggregate estimate provided in OMB’s 2009 report 
on the costs and benefits of federal regulation.51 OMB’s estimate is based 
                                                                                                                      
rules as of 1988 based on Hahn and Hird, supra note 17; in 2009 dollars, this is $132 billion); 
infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 46. Hazilla & Kopp, supra note 44, at 867 tbl.3. 
 47. OMB 2001 REPORT, supra note 42, at 11 tbls.1 & 2.  
 48. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 30 tbl.5 (reporting costs in 2009 dollars). 
 49. Id.  
 50.  Johnson, supra note 18, at 455 & n.37. 
 51. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 30 tbl.5. 
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on the RIA the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
filed for major rules issued in the relevant years. 
II. THE MANY SHORTCOMINGS OF CRAIN AND CRAIN’S ESTIMATE 
Crain and Crain’s study is littered with misunderstandings, mistakes, 
and double counting. At every step of the way, they choose data and  
assumptions that make the costs climb higher and higher. At every step of 
the way, they also make outright, objective errors that have the same effect. 
The result is a mix of apparent bias and ineptitude that make their estimate 
of $1.75 trillion wholly unreliable. 
We begin by discussing the flaws in Crain and Crain’s estimate of the 
costs of economic regulation, and then turn to the flaws in their estimates 
regarding environmental and workplace regulations. 
A. Economic Regulation 
Crain and Crain’s one-equation analysis of economic regulation has at 
least four fatal flaws, any one of which would be enough to destroy its pre-
diction of a $1.24 trillion loss. First, Crain and Crain have misunderstood 
the scale of the RQI and the meaning of the number they treat as a perfect 
score. Second, they have inappropriately lumped together seven years of 
extremely similar data in the same equation, creating a spurious appearance 
of statistical significance. Third, there is in fact no correlation between the 
RQI and per capita income among high-income countries. Fourth, correla-
tion is not causation: if the RQI does show that the United States has a 
higher quality of regulations than some middle-income countries, this could 
mean either that better regulations create higher incomes, or that higher 
incomes allow the creation of better regulations. 
1. Why Be Normal? 
The normal distribution—also known as the Gaussian distribution or 
the bell curve—is one of the most familiar and frequently used distribu-
tions in statistics. As is well known, it has no maximum or minimum value; 
rather, values farther and farther away from the mean become less and less 
probable. Thus it is common to describe the probability of a normally 
distributed variable falling within a certain distance from the mean. For 
example, there is a ninety-five percent probability that a randomly chosen 
value of a normally distributed variable falls within 1.96 standard deviations 
of the mean. Or, in the example used by the authors of the RQI, there is a 
ninety-nine percent probability of such a variable falling within about 2.5 
standard deviations of the mean. 
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Crain and Crain missed this elementary fact about normal distribu-
tions, and assumed that 2.5 standard deviations is an absolute upper limit 
and -2.5 is an absolute lower limit. They are wrong both in theory and in 
the empirical description of the RQI (which, as noted above, is defined as a 
normally distributed variable with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 
one). For the 207 countries for which the World Bank researchers reported 
an RQI value for 2008, the RQI ranged from -2.66 in Somalia to 1.98 in 
Hong Kong. The highest RQI on record is 2.23 for Singapore; since 2002, 
no country has received an RQI of 1.99 or higher.52 If, instead of the arbi-
trary target of 2.5, Crain and Crain had assumed that the best the United 
States could do was to match the best existing performance on the RQI—
reaching the state of regulatory nirvana achieved by Hong Kong—then the 
potential improvement, and hence the estimated costs of economic regula-
tion, would have been cut roughly in half. That is, even if one accepted the 
rest of their methodology, about $600 billion of Crain and Crain’s supposed 
costs of regulation would be eliminated, with no change in information 
about any United States regulations, simply by reading the international 
RQI data in a more measured and defensible manner. 
More broadly, Crain and Crain use the RQI with little thought about 
its limitations. As two of the developers of the World Bank’s governance 
indicators (including the RQI) have written, “Governance indicators can be 
used for regular cross-country comparisons . . . [but] they often remain 
blunt tools for monitoring governance and studying the causes and conse-
quences of good governance at the country level.”53 They further caution 
users, noting: 
All governance indicators include measurement error and so should 
be thought of as imperfect proxies for the fundamentals of good 
governance . . . . Whenever possible, such margins of error should 
be explicitly acknowledged, as they are in the WGI [the database 
that includes the RQI], and taken seriously when the indicators are 
used to monitor progress on governance.54 
The RQI estimates are published with standard errors, implying that the 
authors of the database believe that about two-thirds of the time, the true 
value will fall within one standard error of the reported value. For the 
United States in 2008, the RQI is 1.55 and the standard error is 0.22,  
implying that there is a two-thirds probability that the “true” United States 
                                                                                                                      
 52. See Worldwide Governance Indicators, supra note 27.  
 53. Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where 
Should We Be Going?, 23 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 25 (2008). 
 54. Id. at 26. 
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RQI is between 1.33 and 1.77.55 Of the 207 countries with RQI values for 
2008 reported in the World Bank database, there were only fourteen with 
RQI above the United States value of 1.55, and just six with RQI above 
1.77, the upper limit of the United States confidence interval: Denmark, 
Hong Kong, Ireland, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.56 
The evidence is meager that the United States lags significantly behind 
other countries in the quality of its regulations as measured by the World 
Bank’s RQI. Yet the unexplained hope for a great leap forward in the RQI, 
well beyond all worldwide experience to date, is the fulcrum for most of 
Crain and Crain’s estimated regulatory costs. 
The RQI is just one of the World Bank’s regulatory indicators; another 
one, the “doing business indicator,” is explicitly designed to measure how 
easy it is to set up and run a business in 183 countries around the world.57 
The doing business indicator confirms that the United States is close to the 
top, ranking fifth in the world behind Singapore, Hong Kong, New  
Zealand, and the United Kingdom.58 The ranking is purely ordinal, with no 
theoretical maximum. The United States could aspire to be number one, 
but there is no way to tell what economic consequences, if any, might be 
associated with making it easier to do business here than in all 182 other 
countries in the database, rather than just 178. Thus a broader look at the 
World Bank’s regulatory indicators provides no basis for Crain and Crain’s 
presumption that measurable increases in the United States’ regulatory 
quality could boost our rate of economic growth. 
2. Padding the Evidence 
Crain and Crain use seven years of data, annually from 2002 through 
2008, on the RQI, per capita incomes, and other variables. This artificially 
boosts the reported significance of the results; it is a violation of standard 
statistical practice, which makes the regression results misleading. 
To see why this matters, consider the results of a coin toss. Suppose 
that a penny is flipped once and lands heads up. This is clearly not a statis-
tically significant result; it is a random event, expected to occur half the 
time. Now suppose that a penny is flipped seven times in succession, land-
ing heads each time. In contrast to the single toss, seven identical tosses are 
very significant. The chance of getting seven heads in a row is one in 128; 
                                                                                                                      
 55. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 56. See Worldwide Governance Indicators, supra note 27. 
 57. The “doing business indicator” is a tool developed by the Doing Business Project 
and is available at DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness.org (last visited Nov. 4, 
2011). 
 58. Economy Rankings, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
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in other words, we are more than ninety-nine percent sure that seven suc-
cessive tosses will not all be heads. Spend all day flipping pennies, and 
seven successive heads will probably happen at some point; but if it happens 
on the first seven flips, it might lead to questions about whether the penny 
is weighted or the experimenter is biasing the results. 
Now imagine a research paper reporting seven separate observations of 
a single coin toss as if they were independent events. This would mislead-
ingly convert an ordinary, random event—the single toss—into something 
that appears to be highly significant and unlikely to occur by chance alone.  
Crain and Crain combine seven years of annual data for twenty-five 
OECD countries on GDP per capita, the RQI, and other variables. Both 
GDP per capita and the RQI, however, change very little from year to year. 
For the OECD countries, the correlation between GDP per capita in 2007 
and 2008 has an adjusted r2 of 0.999;59 even for the first and last years in 
the Crain and Crain sample, 2002 and 2008, the correlation between GDP 
per capita has an adjusted r2 of 0.982. Thus, the seven years of data on GDP 
per capita, treated by Crain and Crain as separate observations, contain 
virtually identical information about the relative affluence of OECD coun-
tries. The RQI is also highly correlated from year to year: for the OECD 
countries, the correlation between the 2007 and 2008 RQIs has an adjusted 
r2 of 0.944, falling to 0.815 for the RQIs of 2002 versus 2008.60  
In short, the data used by Crain and Crain are much more like seven 
observations of the same coin toss, not seven independent observations of 
new information about the world. As a result, the correlation they report 
between RQI and GDP per capita is spuriously high. 
There are econometric techniques designed for datasets like this with 
serial correlation between observations. Crain and Crain mention, with 
little explanation, that they included country fixed effect variables.61 This 
might be part of an appropriate methodology, but it alone is far from suffi-
cient. Readers interested in pursuing this question should consult the CRS 
study, which repeats the Crain and Crain analysis with a rigorous econo-
metric methodology—and finds no significant relationship between GDP 
per capita and RQI. 
                                                                                                                      
 59. In an ordinary regression analysis, r2 measures how much of the variation in one 
variable (shown on the left-hand side of the equation) can be predicted by assuming a linear 
relationship with the other variables in the equation. The adjusted r2 of 0.999 reported here 
means that 99.9% of the variation among OECD countries in GDP per capita in 2008 can 
be predicted from their GDP per capita in 2007. 
 60. These calculations are based on GDP per capita at market exchange rates down-
loaded from the World Bank website in January 2011 and RQI data downloaded in 
November 2011 for all thirty-four OECD member nations. See Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors, supra note 27. Adjusted r2, discussed supra note 59, is used here to adjust for a small 
sample size. The more familiar, unadjusted r2 would be larger in every case.  
 61. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 22. 
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3. Inside the OECD 
Crain and Crain focus on countries in the OECD, which is often taken 
to be synonymous with high-income, industrialized countries. The organi-
zation, however, has diversified its membership to include a number of 
middle-income countries, including Turkey, Mexico, Chile, and several 
eastern European nations. Some of the middle-income OECD members, 
notably Turkey and Mexico, do have much lower RQI scores. Within the 
high-income OECD member countries, on the other hand, there is literally 
no relationship between income and RQI.  
If we restrict our attention to the nineteen OECD countries with per 
capita GDP above $20,000 in 200862—including northern and western 
Europe, Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, and the United States—then the 
correlation between RQI and the logarithm of per capita GDP (the form of 
the data used by Crain and Crain) for 2008 has an adjusted r2 of -0.06. This 
puzzling result means that there is less relationship between these two data 
series than would be expected by chance alone; the unadjusted r2 is 
0.000003.63  
A graph of the data, highlighting the position of the United States, is 
presented in Figure 1. The absence of a trend is visible in these data. 
FIGURE 1 — GDP PER CAPITA VS RQI, 2008: 
HIGH-INCOME OECD COUNTRIES 
 
Regulatory Quality Index (RQI) 
Global mean = 0, standard deviation = 1 
                                                                                                                      
 62. See GDP per Capita (Current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).  
 63. In the regression of log GDP per capita versus RQI for these countries, the slope 
has a t statistic of -0.008 and a p value of 0.99, implying there is an ninety-nine percent 
probability of getting a relationship at least this good by chance alone, e.g., when comparing 
two series of random numbers. In general, a negative value for adjusted r2 means that there 
is a better than fifty percent probability of getting a relationship this good by chance alone. 
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4. Correlation Is Not Causation 
A correlation can be found between RQI and income only by compar-
ing countries at very different income levels;64 we have seen that this 
relationship disappears within the world of countries above about half the 
United States’ level of income.65 Suppose, for the sake of the argument, 
that the RQI measures something meaningful about the quality of regula-
tion (determining exactly what the RQI measures is an important issue 
which we do not address). Turkey and Mexico, two of the lowest-income 
members of the OECD, also have the lowest RQI scores in the OECD. 
This does not tell us that the quality of regulation makes a country richer 
or poorer; the reverse could equally well be true. 
The United States is much richer than Turkey or Mexico, and, accord-
ing to the RQI, has much better regulations. Does this mean that better 
regulation made the United States richer? Or does it mean that being richer 
enabled the United States to adopt better regulations? Or, since the RQI is 
based on the perception of regulatory quality by a number of observers, does 
the greater wealth of the United States lead to a perception that it has 
better regulations than Turkey or Mexico? Even if the Crain and Crain 
calculation was reliable and problem free (which it definitely is not, as seen 
above), it would founder on this shoal: their estimate of regulatory costs 
depends on the unstated premise that causation is all one way, from regula-
tory quality to income. If, instead, wealth creates better regulation, their 
entire argument sinks beneath the waves. 
If correlation implied causation, in the manner assumed by Crain and 
Crain, then their curious finding of negative correlation between GDP per 
capita and primary school enrollment would suggest another low-cost route 
to wealth: throw kids out of school. We almost hesitate to mention this, 
given the viral spread of Crain and Crain’s implausible conclusions 
throughout current political debates. We trust that it is self-evident that the 
                                                                                                                      
 64. OECD membership now includes thirty-four countries at varying income levels. 
Crain and Crain used twenty-five of these countries in their analysis; the CRS study used 
thirty. See COPELAND, supra note 15, at 27; CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 21. Neither 
study reported which countries they included. The previous section of this Article referred 
only to the nineteen highest-income OECD members—a group that corresponds, we be-
lieve, to the common (mis)understanding of OECD membership as a synonym for high 
income. This section discusses our exploration of the data for all thirty-four countries; it 
does not include the other explanatory variables used by Crain and Crain and by the CRS 
study, so it is not directly comparable to those results.  
 65. United States GDP per capita was $38,345 in 2008, according to the World Bank. 
GDP per Capita (Current US$), supra note 62. 
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error lies in giving credence to Crain and Crain’s calculations, not in the 
idea of educating children.66  
B. Environmental Regulation 
Crain and Crain’s estimates of the costs of environmental regulations 
likewise suffer from several basic flaws. First, they are based on evi-
dence—and regulations—so old as to be unreliable, as OMB itself has 
acknowledged.67 Second, they rely heavily on an outdated version of general 
equilibrium analysis, analysis which, even if updated to reflect the current 
state of the art, would nonetheless remain deeply problematic in its  
assumptions. Third, these estimates contain objective errors, such as double 
counting of the same costs and inclusion of costs for rules that do not exist.  
1. Old Data on Old Rules 
Crain and Crain’s estimates of the costs of environmental regulations 
come from OMB’s 2001–2009 reports on federal regulation. The earliest of 
these reports provide estimates of regulatory costs going back decades. In 
2003, OMB stopped providing such estimates for the costs of regulations 
that had been issued more than ten years before, explaining that long-ago 
estimates were not reliable guides for current policy.68 Several years before, 
OMB had explained that it was hard to justify continuing to debit such 
costs to the federal government’s regulatory program, as it was unlikely that 
if the regulations were pulled, businesses would actually withdraw whatever 
protections they had installed in response to the relevant regulations.69 In 
its 2002 report, moreover, OMB had cast a skeptical eye on aggregate cost 
estimates that attempted to announce an overall figure for the costs of old 
and new regulations, observing:  
                                                                                                                      
 66. Crain and Crain never precisely defined their educational enrollment variable, but 
they reportedly told CRS that their negative coefficient on educational enrollment could 
reflect “aging pyramid” effects. COPELAND, supra note 15, at 27. If lower-income OECD 
nations such as Turkey and Mexico have younger populations than other OECD members, 
then school-age children, and hence school enrollment, may be a larger percentage of the 
total population in the lower-income countries. This could create a negative correlation 
between educational enrollment and income per capita in the Crain and Crain dataset. 
 67. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION: 2002 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED 
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 40 (2002) [hereinafter OMB 2002 
REPORT] (describing plans for subsequent reports). 
 68. See id.; see also COPELAND, supra note 15, at 21. 
 69. COPELAND, supra note 15, at 24–25 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (1997)). 
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We included these aggregate estimates in the appendix rather than 
the text to emphasize the quality differences in the two sets of  
estimates. The estimates of the costs and benefits of Federal regu-
lations over the period of April 1, 1995, to March 31, 2001, are 
based on agency analyses subject to public notice and comments 
and OMB review under E.O. 12866. The estimates . . . for earlier 
regulations were based on studies of varying quality. Some are 
first-rate studies published in peer-reviewed journals. Others are 
non-random surveys of questionable methodology. And some esti-
mates are based on studies completed 20 years ago for regulations 
issued over 30 years ago, whose precise costs and benefits today are 
unknown.70 
By 2003, these older estimates had disappeared entirely from OMB’s  
report, and they have not come back. 
Despite OMB’s admonition against using cost estimates that are over 
ten years old, Crain and Crain use OMB estimates of regulatory costs 
going back more than twenty years. In using Hazilla and Kopp’s estimates 
for rules issued prior to 1988, they go back to the very beginning of United 
States environmental law. As OMB itself has observed, costs going back 
this far are unreliable.71 The great bulk of Crain and Crain’s estimate of the 
costs of environmental regulation comes from numbers generated so long 
ago that OMB does not now use them in its own calculations. Crain and 
Crain should not have used them either. If Crain and Crain had followed 
OMB’s cautions about the unreliability of these old estimates, and elimi-
nated them from their estimate, the total cost of environmental regulation 
would have fallen from $281 billion to $48 billion.72 
As we explain below, even this much smaller figure contains large  
errors. 
2. Is Our Real Problem Voluntary Unemployment? Really? 
Crain and Crain’s calculations for rules adopted before 1988 relied on 
the Hazilla and Kopp study73—which is, strictly speaking, an estimate of 
potential economic consequences, from 1981 through 1990, of major envi-
ronmental rules in effect in 1982. To make that estimate, Hazilla and Kopp 
applied a general equilibrium framework, familiar in textbook economics, in 
which economic changes are often governed by household responses to 
                                                                                                                      
 70. OMB 2002 REPORT, supra note 67, at 39. 
 71. Id. at 40. 
 72. This is based on converting Crain and Crain’s estimate of costs “through 2000” to 
2009 dollars. See CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 26 tbl.3. 
 73. Hazilla & Kopp, supra note 44, at 856–57. 
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small price differentials, including the (voluntary) choice between leisure 
and labor.74  
Even within the narrow field of abstract economic models of regulatory 
costs, Hazilla and Kopp’s 1990 paper no longer represents the state of the 
art. Newer work has identified many subtleties in the modeling of envi-
ronmental regulations, and leads to a surprisingly wide range of possible 
outcomes, including ones quite different from Hazilla and Kopp’s esti-
mates.75 Nonetheless, Crain and Crain chose to rely on Hazilla and Kopp, 
not on newer work in this field.  
Although the Hazilla and Kopp estimate of regulatory costs is driven 
by a decrease in employment, this is not involuntary unemployment, of the 
sort seen in recessions and all too well known in reality today. The general 
equilibrium framework used in economics typically assumes that all mar-
kets clear—that is, supply equals demand for every commodity and for 
factors of production such as labor.76 Instead, the reduction in employment 
of interest to Hazilla and Kopp stems from a voluntary choice: looking at 
the higher prices, and consequently lower real wages, that result from envi-
ronmental protection costs, households decide that they would prefer to 
reduce their aggregate hours of work by about one percent.77 Leisure is 
presumably just as rewarding as ever, but labor is slightly less rewarding at 
the slightly lower real wages, so rational utility maximizers (the only spe-
cies of human beings found in the model) choose to work slightly less. For 
someone working a forty–hour, fifty–week year, one percent less work is a 
reduction of twenty hours, or 2.5 days, per year. All the costs of pre-1989 
                                                                                                                      
 74. Hazilla and Kopp’s description of their model begins with a discussion of the 
importance and the challenge of modelling household preferences correctly, and cites  
numerous other economic models in a similar vein. Id. at 857–62. They observe that their 
model “is suitable for assessing long-run impacts of regulatory programs on neoclassical 
economic growth,” i.e., impacts on abstract economic models. Id. at 859. 
 75. See, e.g., Don Fullerton & Garth Heutel, The General Equilibrium Incidence of 
Environmental Mandates, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y, Aug. 2010, at 64. 
 76. Hazilla and Kopp are not explicit about their labor market assumptions. The 
paper they cite as the source of their model includes the possibility of involuntary unem-
ployment, but does not discuss it. It does, however, highlight the household decision about 
voluntary leisure time. Edward A. Hudson & Dale W. Jorgenson, U.S. Energy Policy and 
Economic Growth, 1975-2000, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 461 (1974). 
For a discussion on the limitations of general equilibrium models for policy analysis, 
with an emphasis on trade policy, see Frank Ackerman & Kevin Gallagher, The Shrinking 
Gains from Global Trade Liberalization in Computable General Equilibrium Models: A Critical 
Assessment, 37 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 50 (2008). For a discussion on the limitations of the 
underlying economic theory, see Frank Ackerman, Still Dead After All These Years: Interpreting 
the Failure of General Equilibrium Theory, 9 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 119 (2002). 
 77. Labor supply in the environmental cost scenario is 0.84% lower than in the no-
regulation baseline in 1981, and 1.18% lower in 1990. Hazilla & Kopp, supra note 44, at 867 
tbl.3. 
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regulations, for Crain and Crain, are consequences of this minor, voluntary 
adjustment in working hours. 
Since it is a voluntary choice, why complain about workers choosing 
more leisure? The problem, for Hazilla and Kopp, is as old as the Protestant 
ethic: more work means more income, some of which is saved and can be 
invested in capital goods, leading to faster economic growth—but more 
leisure just means another 2.5 days at the beach. In the folkloric tradition of 
kingdoms lost for a nail, it is the imposition of environmental regulations—
which raised prices, which lowered real wages, which made workers choose 
more leisure, which lowered incomes, which lowered savings, which lowered 
investment, which caused slower economic growth—which imposed such 
burdensome costs on the economy. 
What’s wrong with this long and winding tale of economic causation? 
One might well question the real-world relevance of a model of automatic 
full employment. In a world with business cycles and involuntary unem-
ployment, it is quite possible that regulatory costs could lead to increased 
expenditures and employment.78 Beyond such fundamental questions about 
general equilibrium modeling, there are several additional problems with 
the Hazilla and Kopp analysis. 
For one thing, there is no sign of awareness of any possible benefits of 
regulation—to human health, to nature, or even to the economy. Hazilla 
and Kopp analyzed the economic impact of the earliest regulations adopted 
under the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act—rules that save thou-
sands of people per year from dying of lung disease, prevent rivers from 
catching fire, and keep lead out of gasoline. Is the main economic impact of 
these sweeping changes in our conditions of life really a slight increase in 
prices that inspires workers to do one percent less work? Even in narrowly 
economic terms, healthier people, with fewer respiratory diseases, are more 
productive workers, and children growing up free of exposure to lead have, 
on average, higher IQs and higher lifetime earnings prospects.79  
More broadly speaking, the benefits of clean air and clean water are 
immensely valuable, and widely valued. In EPA’s retrospective cost-benefit 
analysis of the early stages of the Clean Air Act, the estimated value of the 
benefits is more than forty times the costs, and more than enough to  
                                                                                                                      
 78. When, as at present, businesses are earning significant profits but not investing 
them due to a lack of demand for their products, regulations could force businesses to spend 
some of those profits on pollution controls; that spending would create an economic stimu-
lus. 
 79. E.g., SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 5, at 11 (estimating that regulation saves $76 
billion in child healthcare costs, $38 billion dollars in municipal charges, and thousands of 
lives); EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT: 1990 TO 2010, at 75 (1999), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/sect812/1990-2010/chap1130.pdf (estimating the benefits 
of Clean Air Act regulations to be $110 billion). 
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outweigh Hazilla and Kopp’s estimates of regulatory costs.80 Crain and 
Crain, following in Hazilla and Kopp’s footsteps, were happy to use calcula-
tions based on EPA’s estimates of the costs of regulation, but entirely 
ignored EPA’s much larger estimates of the benefits of the same rules.81  
Another problem is that Hazilla and Kopp’s projections of the costs of 
regulations grow rapidly over time, and should by now be vastly—but 
laughably—larger than Crain and Crain’s estimate. The number used by 
Crain and Crain to represent the current costs of environmental regulations 
adopted before 1989 is in fact Hazilla and Kopp’s estimate of costs as of 
1985 (adjusted for inflation), mislabeled as the cost in 1988.82 There is, 
however, no reason to stop in 1985: the Hazilla and Kopp cost estimate is 
much larger for 1990, the last year in their analysis, than for 198583—and 
the logic of their model implies that the costs resulting from 1980s regula-
tions should have continued to escalate, considerably faster than inflation, 
beyond 1990.  
The rapid, ongoing escalation can be seen in a comparison of Hazilla 
and Kopp’s social cost projections to EPA’s estimates of direct compliance 
costs. The true social cost of early 1980s clean air and clean water rules, 
according to Hazilla and Kopp, was 67% of EPA’s estimate of direct compli-
ance costs in 1981, rising to 126% in 1985 and 258% in 1990.84 Hazilla and 
Kopp’s social costs were lower than direct compliance costs in 1981, the first 
year of the rules they analyzed, because they subtracted the assumed value 
of the increase in leisure. Yet, over time, the cumulative, dynamic effects of 
reduced labor become steadily more important. Every year that workers 
work less, thereby reducing income, savings, investment, and growth, the 
next year’s GDP becomes smaller than it would have been. As time goes on, 
the reductions in income and growth are compounded, so the regulatory cost 
scenario falls farther and farther behind the no-regulation baseline.  
As a result, the social cost of regulation, defined as the gap between the 
baseline and regulatory cost scenarios, grows ever larger. 
                                                                                                                      
 80. See Retrospective Study—Study Design and Summary of Results, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/retro.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).  
 81. The OMB reports on which Crain and Crain rely for their estimates of the costs 
of rules issued after 1988, CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 26 tbl.3, themselves rely on 
EPA’s estimates of costs as reflected in their RIAs for major rules. Id. at 25. 
 82. The error in dates occurs in Hahn and Hird’s treatment of the Hazilla and Kopp 
estimate. In the appendix explaining their numbers, Hahn and Hird recognized that they 
were using an inflation-adjusted version of Hazilla and Kopp’s estimate for 1985. Hahn & 
Hird, supra note 17, at 272 & n.224 (explaining their $77.6 billion figure). In the body of 
their article, however, Hahn and Hird inserted the same number, without comment or 
adjustment, into a table of regulatory costs and benefits in 1988. Id. at 256 tbl.2. 
 83. Hazilla and Kopp, supra note 44, at 865 tbl.2. 
 84. Calculated from id. 
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From 1981 to 1985, Hazilla and Kopp’s social cost estimate, measured in 
constant (inflation-adjusted) dollars, grows by an average of 20.5% per year. 
From 1985 to 1990, the growth rate is only slightly slower, at 18.8% per 
year.85 Nothing is said in the article (or in the subsequent articles citing it) 
about what growth rates to expect beyond 1990; two hypothetical examples, 
however, demonstrate the importance of this question. First, if the post-
1985 rate of growth, 18.8% annually, continued into the future, then by 2009 
the social cost of early-1980s environmental regulation would have reached 
$8.8 trillion, well over half of the GDP. Second, if the rate of growth con-
tinued to decline by 1.7 percentage points every five years, as it did from 
the early- to late-1980s in Hazilla and Kopp’s analysis, then the social cost 
of early-1980s regulations would have been “only” $4.5 trillion by 2009, 
nearly one-third of the GDP.86 Surely these numbers are large enough to 
fail the laugh test: they are humorously, absurdly wrong on their face. In 
order to make sensible, contemporary use of the Hazilla and Kopp esti-
mates, it would be necessary to explain why their growth decelerates or 
stops—an explanation which is not present in Hazilla and Kopp, or in 
Crain and Crain. 
Within the (limited, as we have seen) logic of this model, what pre-
vents the costs of a fixed set of regulations from growing without limit? 
Hazilla and Kopp are not alone in having missed an obvious answer: high 
initial costs of regulatory compliance create an incentive for innovation, 
which lowers future costs. General equilibrium analyses frequently focus on 
the implications of consumers’ and workers’ responses to small price changes, 
such as the one percent reduction in working hours modeled by Hazilla and 
Kopp. Yet they typically omit the comparable response of engineers and 
entrepreneurs to regulations: if compliance costs are high enough, there are 
profits to be made by inventing cheaper alternative technologies. Why 
should entrepreneurs, who are in the business of seeking out new opportu-
nities for profits, be less sensitive to price incentives than households? 
Innovation may seem less predictable than changes in consumer purchases 
or workers’ desire to work—but the assumption that regulation creates an 
incentive for innovation makes sense out of the repeated empirical finding 
that regulatory costs turn out to be lower than predicted in advance.87 
The argument that regulations create important incentives for innova-
tion exists in economics literature. The “Porter hypothesis” claims that 
                                                                                                                      
 85. Calculated from the “Social Cost” estimates, id., converted to constant dollars. 
 86. Calculated by applying the indicated growth rates to the Hazilla and Kopp esti-
mate of social costs in 1990, id., converted to 2009 dollars. 
 87. See e.g., SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 5, at 2; Frank Ackerman, The Unbearable 
Lightness of Regulatory Costs, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1071, 1083 (2006); Thomas O. McGarity 
& Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2002). 
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well-designed regulations can prompt enough innovation to increase the 
competitiveness of regulated firms.88 This idea has been controversial 
among economists, since it implies that, prior to regulation, the firms were 
not maximizing profits. There is, however, extensive empirical evidence to 
support the hypothesis. At a macro level, Germany’s large, longstanding 
trade surplus suggests that the country’s famously strict regulations do not 
destroy competitiveness.89 
The article introducing the Porter hypothesis cites Hazilla and Kopp as 
an example of a study that is biased against regulation by its failure to con-
sider the incentives it creates (as well as the failure to evaluate any benefits 
of regulation).90 A more empirically-grounded account of the economic 
impact of 1980s regulations, the subject of Hazilla and Kopp’s analysis, 
would include, for example, the unexpectedly low cost to society of remov-
ing lead from gasoline, since the catalytic converters introduced by 
automobile manufacturers at about that time required unleaded gasoline.91 
By the 1990s, unleaded gasoline had become the universal standard, and it 
was no longer meaningful to say that its costs were higher than the baseline 
(as assumed in the Hazilla and Kopp cost estimates). Once there was no 
longer any leaded fuel option available on the market, no one could save 
money by going back to it; the only baseline worth talking about was the 
new, healthier world of unleaded gasoline.92  
                                                                                                                      
 88. Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Envi-
ronment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97-98 (1995). 
 89. For a historical analysis of Germany’s institutional framework and its positive 
relationship to economic growth, see Wendy Carlin, West German Growth and Institutions, in 
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN EUROPE SINCE 1945, at 455 (Nicholas Crats & Gianni Toniolo eds., 
1996). For an attempt at quantitative analysis of the effects of German regulations on eco-
nomic growth, finding a positive effect on growth from environmental regulations and a 
negative effect from capital market regulations, see Helge Berger, Regulation in Germany: 
Some Stylized Facts About its Time Path, Causes, and Consequences, 118 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN [J. APPLIED SOC. SCI. STUD.] 185 (1998) 
(Ger.).  
Germany’s trade surplus is documented in the numerous statistical reports available 
from the WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). For example, 
in 2009, Germany had a merchandise trade surplus of $188 billion, second only to China’s 
$196 billion. See WORLD TRADE ORG., INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2010, at 13 
tbl.I.8 (2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2010_e/its2010_e.pdf.  
 90. Porter & van der Linde, supra note 88, at 108. 
 91. See e.g., Frank Ackerman et al., Applying Cost-Benefit Analysis to Past Decisions: Was 
Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 164-65 (2005); Jamie 
Lincoln Kitman, The Secret History of Lead, NATION, Mar. 20, 2000, at 11. 
 92. The Clean Air Act banned the sale of leaded gasoline as of 1996, and other coun-
tries around the world took similar actions. As of June 2011, the only countries relying 
exclusively on leaded gasoline were Myanmar (Burma) and Afghanistan; the only other 
countries still selling any leaded gasoline for road use were Algeria, Iraq, North Korea, and 
Yemen. Robert Taylor & Zac Gethin-Damon, Countries Where Leaded Petrol is Possibly Still 
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Yet phony numbers have a life of their own; repetition of Hazilla and 
Kopp’s estimate, passed from Hahn and Hird to OMB to Crain and Crain, 
continued even as the innovative processes of the real-world economy elim-
inated the costs that were estimated, so long ago, in such a biased manner. 
3. Piling On: Crain and Crain’s Use of OMB Reports on the  
Costs of Environmental Rules 
In their tallies of total costs, Crain and Crain always use the high end 
of the range of OMB’s cost estimates. They explain that agencies underes-
timate costs and that this justifies use of high-end estimates.93 But the 
empirical evidence that exists on actual regulatory costs—limited though it 
may be—does not support Crain and Crain’s assertion that agencies under-
estimate regulatory costs. Indeed, the evidence that exists tends to point in 
the opposite direction.94 Although the refrain that agencies have an incen-
tive to underestimate costs pervades discourse on the costs of regulation,95 
in fact at least EPA often has exactly the opposite incentive. Much envi-
ronmental regulation stems from laws directing EPA to set limits based on 
the best available technology for pollution control.96 A primary considera-
tion in determining which technology is available is economic affordability.97 
In anticipating the inevitable legal challenge to a rule generated within this 
legal framework, EPA has an incentive to overestimate rather than underes-
timate the costs of the technology. If the technology is affordable even 
based on an overly-high cost estimate, then it should survive legal attack.98 
Whether EPA does more harm than good to itself when it deliberately 
highballs its estimates of costs, the fact remains that it does so, and this 
belies the claims that the agency aims at the low end in estimating costs. 
                                                                                                                      
Sold for Road Use as at 17th June 2011 [sic], THE LEAD GRP. (June 17, 2011), http://www. 
lead.org.au/fs/fst27.html.  
California banned the sale of leaded gasoline in 1992, four years earlier than the federal 
government, and found that the initiative had no statistically significant effect on the price 
of gasoline in California. Hayley H. Chouinard & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Gasoline Price Differ-
ences: Taxes, Pollution Regulations, Mergers, Market Power, and Market Conditions, 7 B.E. J. 
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 12, 20 tbl.5 (2007). 
 93. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 27. 
 94. See, e.g., SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 5, at 7; Ackerman, supra note 87, at 1083.  
 95. See, e.g., Morrall, supra note 19, at 29. 
 96. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 627-31. 
 97. See, e.g., Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Construction and 
Development Point Source Category, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,996, 63,002 (Dec. 1, 2009) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 450); Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Perfor-
mance Standards for the Airport Deicing Category, 74 Fed. Reg. 44,676, 44,678 (Aug. 28, 
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 449).  
 98. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 12, at 7 (citing McGarity & Ruttenberg, supra note 87, 
at 2011, 2044–45). 
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It must be remembered, moreover, that the cost estimates in EPA’s  
RIAs always go through OMB review.99 OMB has no incentive to allow 
EPA to underestimate costs, and, indeed, OMB stands ready to direct the 
agency to change cost estimates in the RIAs that accompany major rules 
sent to OMB for review. OMB staff members are not shy about insisting 
on significant changes to RIAs as a condition of OMB clearance.100 Thus, 
although the cost estimates in OMB’s recent reports all come from the 
agency’s own RIAs, those RIAs reflect OMB’s prior input; they are not the 
work product of the agency alone. 
Crain and Crain also justify the use of high-end estimates by emphasiz-
ing that OMB’s annual reports count the costs only of major rules that cost 
$100 million or more per year, and exclude regulatory programs (like  
Superfund) that do not rely on rules as their predominant regulatory  
mechanism.101 Crain and Crain are correct in saying that OMB’s reports do 
not cover the regulatory waterfront. Insofar as OMB estimates only the 
costs and benefits of major rules, it does not capture the costs and benefits 
either of rules costing less than this or of regulatory programs that are not 
primarily implemented through rulemaking.   
But OMB itself has concluded that major rules account for the “vast 
majority” of the total costs of federal rules.102 And Crain and Crain  
themselves tell only a tiny part of the story. As others have observed, they 
completely omit regulatory benefits, as if federal regulatory programs cost 
money but give us nothing in return.103 More subtly, they completely  
ignore the fact that many federal programs in fact provide money to, rather 
than just taking money from, the very industries covered by the regulatory 
programs they criticize. Direct and indirect subsidies cost taxpayers billions 
of dollars every year, yet these costs do not figure at all in Crain and Crain’s 
report.104 
Then there are outright errors that further inflate Crain and Crain’s 
figures on regulatory costs. Table 3 of the study reports the costs of rules 
                                                                                                                      
 99. By definition, RIAs are done for economically significant rules, and OMB reviews 
economically significant rules. 
 100. For a particularly dramatic example of changes made to an RIA during OMB 
review, see Sidney Shapiro, Back to the Future: OMB Intervention in Coal Ash Rule Replicates 
the Bush Administration’s Way of Doing Business, CPRBLOG (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www. 
progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=1DDEA50F-E885-B550-C04BDE576F2C0B6E. 
 101. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 4, 26. 
 102. OMB 2002 REPORT, supra note 67, at 38. 
 103. COPELAND, supra note 15, at 12–13; SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 12, at 1–2, 6. 
 104. See, e.g., AUTUMN HANNA ET AL., GREEN SCISSORS 2011: CUTTING WASTEFUL 
AND ENVIRONMENTALLY HARMFUL GOVERNMENT SPENDING (2011), available at http:// 
heartland.org/sites/default/files/_Green_Scissors_2011_Web_(2)_pdf; Lisa Heinzerling, New 
Directions in Environmental Law: A Climate of Possibility, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 263,  
268–69 (2011). 
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issued “[t]hrough 2000, Q1” and the costs of rules issued from April 1999 to 
September 2001. This double counts the costs of rules issued between April 
1, 1999 and March 31, 2000. It is difficult to know exactly how large a dif-
ference this double counting makes in Crain and Crain’s estimates because 
the OMB reports from which Crain and Crain draw do not provide annual-
ized costs for all of the rules issued in the period of overlap.105 But we do 
know the difference is large. Just considering the costs of the rules for 
which OMB does provide annualized cost estimates, we can see that the 
costs Crain and Crain double count amount to over $3 billion (in 2009 
dollars).106 And this does not include two rules that together, several years 
out, were estimated to cost almost $10 billion.107 For the period October 
2003 to October 2004, Crain and Crain report the costs of all federal rules 
and not just EPA rules.108 The cost of this mistake is just over $1 billion.109 
These errors together account for well over $4 billion of the annual costs 
Crain and Crain attribute to environmental rules for the ten-year period 
from 1999 through 2008. 
Crain and Crain also include the costs of many rules that no longer  
exist. Some of these rules were never put into effect because EPA chose to 
reconsider them. These include air toxics rules on boilers110 and plywood,111 
a New Source Performance Standard for petroleum refineries,112 and the 
                                                                                                                      
 105. OMB 2001 REPORT, supra note 42, at 22–28 tbl.4 (reporting costs of rules issued 
between April 1, 1999 and March 31, 2000, some annualized and some single-year). 
 106. See id. (providing the costs of storm water discharges (phase II), handheld  
engines, and section 126 petitions for purposes of reducing interstate ozone transport). All 
of our subsequent estimates of the effect, in dollars, of double counting and other errors on 
Crain and Crain’s total estimates are stated in 2009 dollars. 
 107. See id. (noting the Tier 2/new motor vehicle emissions standards at a cost estimate 
of $5.3 billion per year (1997 dollars) in 2030 and the regional haze rule at a high-cost 
estimate of $4.4 billion per year (1990 dollars) in 2015). 
 108. Crain and Crain report a high-cost estimate of just over $4 billion for this period. 
CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 26 tbl.3.  This is the same as OMB’s estimate for the costs 
of all federal regulations for this same period. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, 
VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND 
TRIBAL ENTITIES 12 tbl.1-3 (2005) [hereinafter OMB 2005 REPORT]. 
 109. $862 million in 2001 dollars. 
 110. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Industrial, 
Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,218 (Sept. 13, 
2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63); OMB 2005 REPORT, supra note 108, at 13 tbl.1–4 
(noting a high-end cost estimate of $876 million in 2001 dollars). 
 111. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Plywood and 
Composite Wood Products; List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, Lesser Quantity Designations, 
Source Category List; Reconsideration, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,820 (July 29, 2005) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 63); OMB 2005 REPORT, supra note 108, at 13 tbl.1–4 (noting a high-end cost 
estimate of $291 million in 2001 dollars). 
 112. See Standards of Performance for Petroleum Refineries, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,751 (Sept. 
26, 2008) (granting reconsideration and stay of the effective date); OFFICE OF MGMT. AND 
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National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for ozone set in 2008.113 
In including rules that the agency itself has pulled, Crain and Crain over-
state actual regulatory costs for the relevant period by almost $11 billion. 
Similarly, Crain and Crain also include rules that no longer exist  
because the courts have overturned them. Rules invalidated by the courts, 
yet embraced within Crain and Crain’s estimates of today’s regulatory costs, 
include the Bush administration’s Clean Air Act rule governing mercury 
from power plants,114 its Clean Water Act rules on concentrated animal 
feeding operations,115 and rules on cooling water intake structures at power 
plants and other facilities.116 The cost of including these rules in Crain and 
Crain’s cost estimates is almost $6 billion. It is also worth noting that two 
of the rules most cited in industry complaints about the aggressiveness of 
the Obama EPA are do-overs of these two invalidated rules—the proposed 
new rules on air toxics from power plants and on cooling water intake struc-
tures.117 Crain and Crain use defunct cost estimates associated with past, 
invalidated incarnations of these rules, and many observers have then taken 
Crain and Crain’s flawed cost estimates as a reason to caution against the 
new rules in this administration—which include new versions of these very 
same rules.118 If ever there was double counting, this surely is it. 
Crain and Crain also double count by including rules that together aim 
at the same regulatory end point. They include the 2006 NAAQS for  
                                                                                                                      
BUDGET, 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 16 
tbl.1–4 (2010) [hereinafter OMB 2009 REPORT] (noting a cost estimate of $7 million in 
2001 dollars). 
 113. See OMB 2009 REPORT, supra note 112, at 16 tbl.1–4 (noting a high-end cost 
estimate of $7.73 billion in 2001 dollars). 
 114. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, 
LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 9 tbl.1–4 (2007) [hereinafter OMB 2006 REPORT] (noting a 
high-end cost estimate of $500 million). 
 115. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM: 2004 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND 
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 18 tbl.4 (2004) (noting a 
cost estimate of $360 million). 
 116. See Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2009) (vacating 
rule); National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish 
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122-125); OMB 2005 REPORT, 
supra note 108, at 13 tbl.1–4 (noting a high-end cost estimate of $383 million). 
 117. See, e.g., AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, EPA’S REGULATORY TRAIN WRECK: 
STRATEGIES FOR STATE LEGISLATORS 12-13, 15 (2011), available at http://timeopinions. 
files.wordpress.com/2011/10/epa-train-wreck-2011-final-full-printres.pdf. 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 7–9. 
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particulate matter119 and the implementation plans for meeting these  
standards,120 while at the same time including other rules that also target 
the same emissions of particulate matter.121 Likewise, Crain and Crain 
include both the estimated costs of the 1997 ozone NAAQS122 and rules 
designed to meet those very standards.123 OMB, for its part, eschews this 
kind of double counting.124 The cost of Crain and Crain’s double counting 
here is well over $10 billion. 
All told, these mistakes add up to over $30 billion out of the $48 bil-
lion Crain and Crain report for the costs of environmental regulation from 
1999 to 2008.125 And this only accounts for Crain and Crain’s double  
counting and their inclusion of nonexistent rules, not for the likely overes-
timation of regulatory costs in RIAs126 or for any other contestable part of 
their analysis. No one, we hope, would argue that it is acceptable to count 
the costs of the same rule more than once in estimating actual regulatory 
costs. Nor, we hope, would anyone argue that the costs of nonexistent rules 
should figure in estimates of actual regulatory costs. Taking out these phan-
tom costs cuts Crain and Crain’s estimate of the costs of environmental 
regulation post-2000 by two-thirds. 
We have not toted up every single possible instance of double counting 
or of counting the costs of rules that are not in force. Once we discovered 
the magnitude of the errors in Crain and Crain’s analysis, it seemed like 
                                                                                                                      
 119. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 71 Fed. Reg. 
61,144 (Oct. 17, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 9 tbl.1-4 (2008) 
[hereinafter OMB 2007 REPORT] (noting a high-end cost estimate of $2.83 billion in 2001 
dollars, equivalent to $3.42 billion in 2009 dollars). 
 120. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, 
LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 11 tbl.1-4 (2009) (noting a high-end cost estimate of $7.32 
billion in 2001 dollars). 
 121. Rules on regional haze, boilers, petroleum refineries, automobile emissions, and 
more: all share particulate matter emissions as one of their regulatory targets. 
 122. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 79 tbl.15 (1998) (noting a cost estimate of $4.5 billion 
in 1996 dollars, equivalent to over $6.1 billion in 2009 dollars). 
 123. See OMB 2006 REPORT, supra note 114, at 8 tbl.1-4 (noting a cost estimate of 
$1.89 billion in 2001 dollars for the Clean Air Interstate Rule Formerly Titled: Interstate Air 
Quality Rule); OMB 2000 REPORT, supra note 42, at 38, 39 (noting a cost estimate of $1.7 
billion in 1990 dollars for the NOx SIP Call). 
 124. See OMB 2007 REPORT, supra note 119, at 36. 
 125. The figures are converted from CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 26 tbl.3, which 
were reported in 2001 dollars, to 2009 dollars based on the figures reported in CRAIN & 
CRAIN, supra note 6, at 31 tbl.6, which were reported in 2009 dollars. 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 94–100. 
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overdoing it to chase after more double counted or miscounted millions 
when we had found so many double counted and miscounted billions. 
But be assured: there are more millions, and even billions, to be found, 
and excised from Crain and Crain’s estimates. For example: OMB’s 1998 
report estimates an annual cost of $17 billion in 1996 dollars for the 1997 
particulate matter NAAQS ($23.28 billion in 2009 dollars). This estimate is 
carried over into Crain and Crain’s estimates through their use of OMB’s 
2001 report. Yet Crain and Crain also include the costs of many rules that 
reduce particulate matter and are aimed in large part at attaining that 1997 
standard. If the 1997 NAAQS rule is removed from Crain and Crain’s  
aggregate cost estimate, that estimate declines by over $23 billion. And 
another example of many millions left on our cutting room floor: Crain and 
Crain’s estimates surely include the costs of EPA’s 1989 ban on asbestos—
overturned in court almost twenty years ago.127  
C. Workplace Safety and Health 
Crain and Crain estimate costs of $64.3 billion for occupational safety 
and health regulations issued prior to 2001, and $471 million for such regu-
lations issued between 2001 and 2008.128 For the costs of rules issued before 
2001, Crain and Crain rely on a book chapter published in 2005 by Joseph 
M. Johnson.129 As Sidney Shapiro and his co-authors from the Center for 
Progressive Reform have tellingly observed, Johnson’s figure has an excep-
tionally dubious provenance: Johnson aggregates cost estimates for 
occupational safety and health rules through 2001, then multiplies them by 
5.55 based on a 1996 study130 which itself relied on a 1974—yes, 1974—
estimate of compliance costs (“unpublished and otherwise unavailable,” 
Shapiro et al. point out) by the National Association of Manufacturers.131 
Despite these awkward origins, Crain and Crain apparently think so highly 
of the Johnson estimate that they report they used the Johnson calculations 
                                                                                                                      
 127. These costs are included in OMB’s 2001 report (incorporated by Crain and Crain) 
through use of estimates compiled in 1996 for major rules issued between 1987 and 1994. 
The asbestos ban was issued in 1989, Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 763 
(1989), and estimated (on the high end, which is what Crain and Crain used) to cost approx-
imately $62 million per year. If Crain and Crain’s analysis is to be believed, we are still 
paying over $100 million a year (based on adjusting the $62 million figure for inflation, as 
Crain and Crain do) for this ban, which was overturned by the courts in 1991. See Corrosion 
Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). For the anti-regulatory 
crowd, this defunct ban is certainly the gift that keeps on giving. See Five Hundred Life-
Saving Interventions, supra note 23, at 156 (criticizing the invalidated asbestos ban in one-third 
of the environmental measures discussed). 
 128. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 30 tbl.5 (reporting cost in 2009 dollars). 
 129. Id. (citing Johnson, supra note 18). 
 130. JAMES, supra note 18. 
 131. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 12, at 9. 
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“where possible, that is, until 2001.”132 Apart from showing a strange pref-
erence for calculations of dubious quality, Crain and Crain’s suggestion that 
it was not possible to use the Johnson estimate for rules after 2001 betrays a 
lack of understanding of how that estimate was derived. All Crain and 
Crain had to do, if they really believed in the Johnson estimate as much as 
they appeared to, was to multiply the cost estimates for rules issued after 
2001 by 5.55!133  
One of us has previously criticized this multiplier, which comes from a 
study by Harvey James:134 
Harvey James estimates the costs of compliance with 25 OSHA 
regulations as of 1993. But he also observes that the cost per firm 
was 5.5 times higher in a 1974 study of OSHA compliance costs 
done by the National Association of Manufacturers. James then 
simply asserts that the costs per firm could not be lower today than 
in 1974. On that basis, he multiplies his 1993 numbers by 5.5—
thereby eliminating all empirical content in his study of 1993 costs, 
and simply recycling a 1974 estimate by an anti-regulatory industry 
group.135 
It is worth noting that James himself had more modest claims for his own 
study, cautioning that his cost calculations were “estimates only . . . and not 
measures of actual expenditures.”136 He emphasized that the rules he stud-
ied had been issued in “different time periods” and that “estimates of the 
compliance costs of OSHA do not take into account new rules, changes in 
existing regulations, or old rules no longer aggressively enforced by the 
agency.”137 None of these cautions reappears in Crain and Crain’s wholesale 
adoption of James’s estimates.138 
Crain and Crain’s estimate for the costs of rules on workplace safety 
and health regulation issued from 2001 to 2008 has the same basic flaw as 
many of their estimates of environmental regulatory costs: the estimate 
                                                                                                                      
 132. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 31. 
 133. Crain and Crain also are mistaken to say that the figure they report for OMB’s 
estimates of the costs of OSHA rules run from 2001 to 2008. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, 
at 30 tbl.5. Actually, the OMB source they cite covers rules from 1998 to 2008. OMB 2009 
REPORT, supra note 112, at 10-11 tbl.1–2. 
 134. JAMES, supra note 18. 
 135. Ackerman, supra note 87, at 1085-86; see also SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 12, at 9. 
 136. JAMES, supra note 18, at 10. 
 137. Id. at 5. 
 138. Nonexistent rules make an appearance here, too: Johnson (based on James) in-
cludes over $1 billion (in 2009 dollars) in costs for OSHA’s air contaminants rule. Johnson, 
supra note 18, at 34 tbl.10. The rule was overturned almost twenty years ago in AFL-CIO v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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includes costs that do not exist.139 To take one example, a good portion—
$327 million out of $470 million—of the costs Crain and Crain report for 
workplace rules from 2001 to 2008 comes from just one rule: OSHA’s rule 
setting limits for hexavalent chromium.140 After this rule was issued, the 
parties challenging the rule agreed to significant changes in the rule to 
make it more flexible and less costly.141 But Crain and Crain use the previ-
ous version of the rule in their analysis.142 Here, too, Crain and Crain 
report the costs of a rule that does not exist in the form they assume. 
CONCLUSION 
If statistical analysis required a driver’s license, Crain and Crain could 
have theirs revoked for reckless and dangerous driving. On economic regu-
lation, their one-equation calculation, worth $1.24 trillion in their fantasy of 
regulatory costs, rests on misunderstanding the definition of their data, 
flunking an elementary question on the normal distribution, padding the 
analysis with seven years of near-identical data, and failing to recognize the 
difference between correlation and causation. Their methods could just as 
easily be read as claiming that economic benefits would result from cut-
backs in education as from cutbacks in regulation—yet, no one has argued 
that is a credible position.  
On environmental regulation, Crain and Crain wheel out decades-old 
studies of decades-old rules. The bulk of their estimate rests on the idea 
that voluntary unemployment is the real culprit in today’s regulatory envi-
ronment. The remainder of it is filled to the brim with nonexistent rules 
and other phantoms—as is their flawed estimate of the costs of workplace 
safety and health rules. 
                                                                                                                      
 139. Crain and Crain also repeat here the error of double counting the costs of some 
years’ regulatory output. Crain and Crain report that their estimates from OMB’s annual 
reports cover the years 2001 to 2008. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at 30 tbl.5. In fact, those 
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in the James study. OMB 2009 REPORT, supra note 112, at 10 tbl.1–2.  
 140. See OMB 2007 REPORT, supra note 119, at 9 tbl.1–4 (reporting a high-end cost 
estimate of $271 million in 2001 dollars for this rule, which works out to approximately $327 
million after adjusting for inflation).  
 141. See Settlement Agreement, Surface Finishing Indus. Council v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Admin., No. 06-2272 and Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Occupa-
tional Safety & Health Admin., No. 06-1818 (3d Cir. Oct. 25, 2006), available at http:// 
www.osha.gov/SLTC/hexavalentchromium/elect_sign_steelworkers.html. 
 142. Crain and Crain rely on OMB’s 2007 estimate of the cost of this rule, which itself 
used OSHA’s estimate of the cost of the original rule and not the rule as changed after 
settlement. See Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,100, 
10,263 (Feb. 28, 2006) (reporting a cost estimate of $288 million per year in 2003 dollars, 
which works out to OMB’s cost of $271 million when 2001 dollars are used); OMB 2007 
REPORT, supra note 119, at 9 tbl.1-4 (reporting a cost estimate of $271 million). 
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It would be bad enough if this were a private study, undertaken with 
private funds, lacking any official imprimatur. Even then, the viral spread 
of the utterly unfounded $1.75 trillion estimate through the public sphere 
would be worrying enough. But this is a study requested, funded, reviewed, 
and edited by a government agency, the SBA’s Office of Advocacy.143  
Taxpayers shelled out almost $100,000 for this nonsense.144 More funda-
mentally, the Office of Advocacy’s sponsorship and official embrace of the 
study—running all the way from initially conceiving the study, funding it, 
reviewing it, and editing it, to officially defending the study in testimony 
before Congress even after it had been severely criticized145—embroils this 
public agency in an unwholesome blend of ineptitude and bias. Before 
funding any more anti-regulatory research that threatens to repeat the  
same sad story,146 the Office of Advocacy should officially, emphatically, 
and loudly disown the methodology and findings of Crain and Crain’s  
problematic report. “Advocacy” is not an excuse for phony numbers. 
                                                                                                                      
 143. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 6, at cover page (stating that report was “reviewed and 
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